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TOWARDS RESPECT FOR CORPORATE
SEPARATENESS IN DEFINING THE
REACH OF CERCLA LIABILITY
by John J. Little*
I. INTRODUCTION
N the ten years since its enactment, the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) l has
given rise to a host of thorny problems left to the federal courts for reso-
lution. To a large extent, these problems have their roots in the lame duck
status of the Congress that enacted CERCLA,2 the multiple compromises
struck in Congress's search for acceptable language,3 and the dearth of legis-
lative debate and history surrounding its enactment.4 Chief among these
problems is CERCLA's reach, as the courts increasingly struggle to discover
the lengths to which the liabilities created by CERCLA extend. In the
course of this effort, the courts have taken a haphazard approach, often
mangling the language of the statute and at times importing common law
notions of liability, while at other times wholly discarding those same
notions.
Defining the reach of CERCLA liability creates particular difficulty when
courts must referee the clash between the language of the statute and the
realities of corporate existence. The statute remains silent, for example, con-
cerning the extent of a parent corporation's liability for the activities of a
present or former subsidiary. A search for language addressing successor
liability is similarly doomed, as is any effort to locate statutory guidance
concerning whether and under what circumstances courts may hold individ-
*B.S. Rutgers University (Cook College); J.D., The Yale Law School; Partner, Hughes
& Luce, Dallas, Texas.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988), as amended by the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA).
2. "CERCLA was rushed through a lame duck session of Congress, and therefore, might
not have received adequate drafting." Ohio ex rel. Brown v. Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. 1300,
1310 n.12 (N.D. Ohio 1983).
3. The final version of CERCLA "was enacted as a 'last minute compromise' between
three competing bills." Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 667 (5th Cir. 1989);
Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074, 1080 (1st Cir. 1986).
CERCLA "was an eleventh hour compromise." New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d
1032, 1040 (2d Cir. 1985).
4. "CERCLA has acquired a well-deserved notoriety for vaguely drafted provisions and
an indefinite, if not contradictory, legislative history." Dedham Water Co., 805 F.2d at 1080
(quoting United States v. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. 898, 902 (D.N.H. 1985)). "CERCLA's legis-
lative history is shrouded with mystery .... " Id. at 1081.
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ual directors, officers, and employees personally liable for corporate activi-
ties. In addressing these situations, the courts continue to reach widely
disparate results. Many discard the principles of corporate separateness and
impose CERCLA liability directly upon parent corporations and corporate
individuals, despite the absence of any statutory or common law basis. Gen-
erally, these courts rely upon factually specific analyses and CERCLA's
scant legislative history and perceived purposes to justify this result. In con-
trast, other courts staunchly defend corporate separateness and employ only
traditional common law notions to define the extent to which CERCLA lia-
bility exists beyond the language of the statute. The result, unfortunately, is
that uncertainty concerning CERCLA liability pervades the business world
and clutters the courts. Efforts to predict when courts will or will not im-
pose liability in a corporate context result in little more than a roll of the
dice.
This article examines some of the leading cases that address the extent to
which courts should impose CERCLA liability in various corporate con-
texts. The article suggests that, in order to enhance predictability and effi-
ciency and better serve the language of the statute, courts must reject the
factually intensive and policy driven approach used by many jurisdictions.
The article urges the courts to adopt a single approach that protects corpo-
rate separateness in all contexts and that limits CERCLA liability to the
plain meaning of the statute, unless one of the traditional methods of avoid-
ing that separateness applies.
II. THE STATUTORY SCHEME
At first glance, the liability scheme created by CERCLA seems straight-
forward. CERCLA creates liability for the clean-up of contaminated prop-
erty when the following four elements are established:
1. The contaminated property or site is a facility;
2. A release or threatened release of a hazardous substance from the
site has occurred;
3. Response costs have been incurred as a result of the release or
threatened release; and
4. The party to be held liable falls within one of the four classes of
responsible persons described in section 9607(a) of CERCLA. 5
While there has been considerable litigation concerning the contours of the
first three elements, 6 they are easily established in most cases. As for the
5. Amoco Oil Co., 889 F.2d at 668; United States v. Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872
F.2d 1373, 1379 (8th Cir. 1989).
6. See, e.g., Amoco Oil Co., 889 F.2d at 669-72 (establishing that gas emanating from
disposed radionuclides and disposal of radioactive waste on the property constitutes a release,
and that security measures and site investigation cause one to incur recoverable response
costs); Vermont v. Staco, Inc., F. Supp. 822, 832-34 (D. Vt. 1988) (discussing the meaning of
release and construing the term broadly to include "any environmental presence of a hazard-
ous substance originating from a known industrial, manufacturing, or storage facility"); and
United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 743 (8th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987) (addressing the meaning of facility and construing the
term broadly to include "virtually any place at which hazardous wastes have been dumped, or
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fourth element, CERCLA appears to define the parties upon which it im-
poses liability in relatively clear, unambiguous terms. Section 9607(a) de-
fines the four classes of potentially liable persons7 as:
(1) the owner and operator of... a facility,8
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substances
owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances
were disposed of,9
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for
disposal or treatment ... of hazardous substances owned or pos-
sessed by such person .... 0 and
(4) any person"I who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for
transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or
sites selected by such person, from which there is a release, or such
threatened release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of
a hazardous substance. 12
Thus, for any given contaminated facility, it seems clear that CERCLA
imposes liability upon the person(s) that currently own(s) or operate(s) the
facility, the person(s) that owned or operated the facility at the time or times
it became contaminated, the person(s) that generated the substances that
contaminated the facility, and the person(s) that transported those contami-
nating substances to the facility.
This apparent clarity disappears when courts, faced with contaminated
sites and no readily identifiable, solvent person capable of shouldering clean-
other wise disposed of." (quoting United States v. Ward, 618 F. Supp. 884, 895 (E.D.N.C.
1985))).
7. A person is defined as "an individual, firm, corporation, association, partnership, con-
sortium, joint venture, commercial entity," or governmental entity. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21)
(1988).
8. Courts read the word "and" in this subsection to mean "or". See United States v.
Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 578 (D. Md. 1986).
9. For purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(l)-(2), owner or operator is defined circularly as
a person "owning or operating such facility." Id. § 9601(20)(A)(ii). Excluded from the defini-
tion of "owner or operator" is "a person, who, without participating in the management of a
... facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect his security interest in the...
facility." Id. § 9601 (20)(A)(iii). This exception was intended to protect secured creditors. In
response to Congressional pressure and recent decisions concerning this exception, the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency issued its "EPA Draft Proposal Defining Lender Liability Issues
Under the Secured Creditor Exemption of CERCLA" (Sept. 14, 1990). [Current Develop-
ments] Env't. Rep. (BNA) 1162-67 (October 12, 1990). An examination of secured creditor
liability is beyond the scope of this article.
10. Persons liable under this subsection are commonly referred to as generators.
11. Persons liable under this subsection are commonly referred to as transporters.
12. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(l)-(4) (1988). At least one court has concluded that the language
of § 9607(a) is clear enough to prohibit judicial extension of the four classes created by the
statute:
Congress was not, however, ambiguous with regard to which persons could be
liable under CERCLA. Congress explicitly set forth four categories of poten-
tially responsible parties. Even if CERCLA was hastily assembled .... Con-
gress must still be satisfied with the four categories since no changes were made
to the basic structure of CERCLA during the 1986 amendments.
Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 734 F. Supp. 793, 795 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (declining to
impose liability upon corporate successors to owner and operator of facility), reversed - F.2d




up responsibility, wrestle with the meaning of terms such as person, owner,
operator, and the like. Most courts that have addressed issues of corporate
separateness have done so in the process of determining whether to hold
accountable an allegedly responsible party that is not clearly within one of
the four classes defined by section 9607(a).
III. CONTEXTS IN WHICH LIABILITY ARISES
These issues arise in three distinct but related contexts in which the stat-
ute remains silent. In one context, courts consider whether individuals asso-
ciated with a corporate entity as officers, directors, employees or
stockholders personally are liable for activities that establish corporate liabil-
ity under CERCLA. In another, courts examine the liability, if any, of cor-
porate successors to entities liable under CERCLA. Finally, courts must
determine the extent to which corporate parents are responsible for the
CERCLA liability of present or former subsidiaries. Unfortunately, courts
considering these issues have reached divergent conclusions and have shown
varying degrees of concern for traditional notions of corporate separateness
in each context. Moreover, the deference paid to corporate separateness has
varied considerably depending upon which of the three contexts the court
addresses.
A. Individual Liability
Corporate separateness generally receives the least consideration by courts
attempting to determine the personal liability of individuals associated with
a corporation for the corporation's CERCLA liability. One court recog-
nized that courts often, without hesitation, hold corporate individuals per-
sonally liable pursuant to CERCLA.13 On that basis, the court concluded
that:
CERCLA's statutory scheme varies the configuration of traditional cor-
porate principles which prevent individual liability absent a conclusion
that an individual engaged in procedural irregularities justifying a court
in "piercing the corporate veil" or that an individual has had close,
active involvement or direct supervision in the events leading to the al-
leged tortious harm.14
Traditionally, an individual associated with a corporation avoids liability
for the acts of the corporation absent proof, for officers, directors and em-
ployees, of the individual's personal involvement in the activities giving rise
to the liability or, absent proof, for shareholders, that the factual circum-
stances justify disregarding the corporation's separate existence by piercing
the corporate veil to reach the shareholders. ' 5 The analysis of several courts
13. Kelley v. Thomas Solvent Co., 727 F. Supp. 1532, 1542 (W.D. Mich. 1989); Kelley ex
rel. Michigan Natural Resources Comm'n v. Arco Indus. Corp., 723 F. Supp. 1214, 1218
(W.D. Mich. 1989).
14. Thomas Solvent, 727 F. Supp. at 1542. Kelley ex rel. Michigan Natural Resources
Comm'n, 723 F. Supp. at 1218; see also United States v. Mottolo, 695 F. Supp. 615, 624
(D.N.H. 1988) ("CERCLA places no importance on the corporate form").
15. See Donsco, Inc. v. Casper Corp., 587 F.2d 602, 606 (3d Cir. 1978) (discussing tradi-
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notwithstanding, nothing in the language of CERCLA indicates that Con-
gress intended to alter this traditional rule.16 Nevertheless, courts began to
discard or ignore the traditional rule early in their attempts to apply CER-
CLA to situations involving corporate individuals.
In United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co.
(NEPACCO), 17 for example, the court began its analysis of the alleged liabil-
ity of two corporate officers by focusing upon the inclusion of both individu-
als and corporations in the statutory definition of a person and noting that
the definition did not exclude corporate officers and employees. 18 Building
upon that observation, the court concluded that it should not create such an
exclusion and that, in a given case, a court could impose liability directly
upon both a corporation and its officers.
From this questionable exercise in construction, the court found one of
the officers individually liable because of his actual knowledge of, direct su-
pervision of, and responsibility for the transportation and disposal of the
plant's hazardous substances.19 This result is hardly surprising; indeed, it is
no different than the result that a court would reach under a traditional
approach, given the individual officer's personal involvement in the activity
giving rise to the corporate liability. 20 The NEPACCO court also went be-
yond the traditional rule, however, stating that the critical factor in the im-
position of CERCLA liability was the officer's authority to control the
movement and disposal of the plant's hazardous substances.21 On this basis,
the court proceeded to impose liability on a second corporate officer, the
president, not because of his actual involvement in the activities giving rise
to liability, but because his position gave him ultimate control over the dis-
posal of the plant's hazardous substances.22 Thus, the NEPACCO court ig-
nored traditional liability rules applicable to corporate officers and
eliminated the need for personal involvement in the corporation's wrongful
activity.
In addition, the NEPACCO decision is noteworthy because the court's
tional rules of individual liability for corporate negligence). But cf. Kelly v. Thomas Solvent
Co., 727 F. Supp. 1532, 1542 (W.D. Mich. 1989) (asserting that CERCLA's principles alter
traditional rules in order to justify a court's piercing the corporate veil).
16. Joslyn Corp. v. T.L. James & Co., 696 F. Supp. 222, 226 (W.D. La. 1988), affd, 893
F.2d 80 (1990) ("Neither the clear language of CERCLA nor its legislative history provides
authority for imposing individual liability on corporate officers .... ").
17. 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987).
18. Id. at 743. The absence of such an exclusion is hardly surprising if one assumes that
Congress intended the traditional rule to apply. One would expect such an exclusion only if
Congress intended to change the traditional rule. See Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey, 474
U.S. 494, 501 (1986) ("[t]he normal rule of statutory construction is that if Congress intends
for legislation to change the interpretation of a judicially created concept, it makes that intent
specific.").
19. NEPACCO, 810 F.2d at 743.
20. In fact, the court referenced the traditional rule that " '[a] corporate officer is individ-
ually liable for the torts he ... personally commits on behalf of the corporation and cannot
shield himself ... behind a corporation when he ... is an actual participant in the tort.' " Id.
at 744 (quoting Nonsco, Inc. v. Casper Corp., 587 F.2d 602, 606 (3d Cir. 1978)).
21. Id. at 743.
22. Id. at 745.
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analysis of the corporate officers' liability did not consider whether to impose
the corporation's liability upon the officers in a derivative sense, because of
their individual activity, as it would have under a common law approach.
Instead, the NEPACCO court imposed liability upon these officers directly
and personally, finding, for example, one of the officers personally liable
under CERCLA as a generator because he organized the transportation and
disposal of the plant's hazardous substances. 23 Thus, NEPACCO established
the notion that courts could hold corporate officers personally and directly
liable under CERCLA as a result of their participation in or authority over
activities giving rise to corporate CERCLA liability.
The court in New York v. Shore Realty Corp. 24 similarly went beyond the
traditional rule to impose liability upon an individual who was both the sole
shareholder and an officer of a corporation owning contaminated property.
In Shore Realty, the individual created the corporation for the purpose of
purchasing and operating the property at issue. 25 The Shore Realty court,
noting that New York courts reluctantly disregard the corporate form, re-
fused to pierce the corporate veil to reach this individual. It concluded, nev-
ertheless, that he was liable directly as an operator-despite the
contemporaneous existence of the corporate operator-because of his per-
sonal involvement in the corporation's activity. 26 In reaching this result, the
court relied upon a tortured reading of the secured creditor exemption.27
Specifically, the Shore Realty court reasoned that the language of the exemp-
tion, which excludes from liability as owner or operator one who holds indi-
cia of ownership to protect a security interest while failing to participate in
the management of the facility, implied the imposition of liability on an own-
ing shareholder who also manages the corporation. 28 This view, which
equates indicia of ownership to protect a security interest with stock owner-
ship, plainly is incorrect. 29 Nothing in the statute or legislative history indi-
cates that the secured creditor exemption intended to address stock
ownership; therefore, the exemption can and should remain limited to se-
cured creditors.
23. Id. at 744.
24. 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985).
25. Id. at 1038. At least one court has suggested that, if done lawfully and not fraudu-
lently, such activity should be encouraged by respecting corporate separateness and not dis-
couraged by disregarding it. See In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor Proceedings,
675 F. Supp. 22, 32 (D. Mass. 1987).
26. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d at 1052.
27. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A)(1988). See supra note 9.
28. Shore Realty Corp. 759 F.2d at 1052.
29. Id. A number of other courts subsequently adopted this misreading. See, e.g., United
States v. Nicolet Inc., 712 F. Supp. 1193, 1203 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (holding the sole stockholder
liable for his parent corporation's former ownership and operation of a subsidiary's hazardous
waste site); United States v. Northernair Plating Co., 670 F. Supp. 742, 748 (W.D. Mich.
1987), affd sub nom. United States v. R.W. Meyer, Inc., 889 F.2d 1497 (6th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 1527, 108 L.Ed. 767 (1990) (holding the president and sole shareholder
liable due to his participation in directing the handling of hazardous waste products); United
States v. Ward, 618 F. Supp. 884, 894-95 (E.D.N.C. 1985) (holding the majority shareholder
who also acted as president, chief operating officer, and director personally liable under a
contract to procure the removal of hazardous waste products).
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Shore Realty, like NEPACCO, adopts the view that courts may hold cor-
porate individuals directly liable for activities conducted on behalf of the
corporation without reference to the traditional rules governing such liabil-
ity. Moreover, by considering whether to pierce the corporate veil, Shore
Realty implies that, in addition to this direct liability, corporate individuals
might also remain derivatively liable for a corporation's CERCLA liability
under a traditional, common law test.30
A number of other courts similarly have held individuals directly liable
for corporate activities without addressing the traditional rules for transfer-
ring corporate liabilities to individual officers, directors, and employees. 3'
More recently, at least one court went even further in its departure from
traditional standards for imposing upon individuals direct responsibility for
corporate liabilities. In several decisions, the district court for the Western
District of Michigan announced a "prevention test" for determining when to
hold an individual officer, director, employee, or stockholder directly liable
for corporate activity giving rise to CERCLA liability.32 The court in these
cases acknowledged that CERCLA provides neither standards nor explicit
directions as to whether a court may hold a corporate officer liable.33 The
court, however, then relied upon Shore Realty, NEPACCO, and similar deci-
sions to disregard traditional corporate law and conclude that, in this judi-
cially created absence of traditional corporate principles, a court may hold
an individual personally liable for unlawful hazardous waste practices.
34
The factually intensive prevention test focuses upon "whether the individual
in the close corporation could have prevented or significantly abated the haz-
ardous waste discharge. ' '35
These prevention test cases recognized the disregard of procedural formal-
30. At least one court has attempted more explicitly to adopt such a dual approach to
define the extent of CERCLA liability in a corporate context. See United States v. Kayser-
Roth Corp., 724 F. Supp. 15, 22-24 (D.R.I. 1989), affid, 910 F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1990) (analyz-
ing, for example, issue of direct liability for parent as operator and indirect liability of same
parent under a corporate veil theory).
31. See, e.g., United States v. Mottolo, 695 F. Supp. 615, 624 (D.N.H. 1988) (corporate
president may be held individually liable); Vermont v. Staco, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 822, 831-32
(D. Vt. 1988) (corporate officers found liable without analysis of traditional rule); United
States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1341 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (sole owner and general manager of
corporation formed solely to acquire property found individually liable). But see In the Matter
of Southern Timber Products, Inc., Docket No. 87-13-R (U.S. E.P.A., November 13, 1990),
1990 RCRA Lexis 22 (individual corporate officer could not be liable for violation of Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act absent "circumstances that justify a piercing of the corporate
veil").
32. Kelley v. Thomas Solvent Co., 727 F. Supp. 1554, 1562-65 (W.D. Mich. 1989) (third
party complaintant's motion for summary judgment); Kelley v. Thomas Solvent Co., 727 F.
Supp. 1532, 1543-44 (W.D. Mich. 1989) (government's motion for summary judgment); Kel-
ley ex rel. Michigan Natural Resources Comm'n v. Arco Indus. Corp., 723 F. Supp. 1214,
1219 (W.D. Mich. 1989).
33. Thomas Solvent Co., 727 F. Supp. at 1541, 1560; Arco Indus. Corp., 723 F. Supp. at
1217.
34. Thomas Solvent Co., 727 F. Supp. at 1543, 1561; Arco Indus. Corp. 723 F. Supp. at
1219. The court in these cases also concluded that CERCLA altered traditional corporate
liability principles. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.




ities associated with piercing the corporate veil and differ from a review of
the individual's personal knowledge, direct supervision, or active participa-
tion, found in a traditional tort analysis. 36 Under the prevention test, a cor-
porate individual's power or authority to prevent the waste problem is
critical to a finding of liability.37
Widespread acceptance of this prevention test 38 would make it possible for
CERCLA liability to attach to corporate officers merely because of their
status as officers. 39 It is difficult to imagine a corporate president, majority
stockholder, or plant manager without sufficient ability to prevent or abate
waste disposal or handle practices or both that result in CERCLA liability.
Nothing in the language of CERCLA or in its legislative history indicates
any Congressional desire to depart so drastically from traditional notions of
imposing liability for corporate activities upon individuals.
B. Successor Liability
CERCLA also remains silent concerning whether a court may hold a cor-
poration responsible for the CERCLA liability of its predecessor and, if so,
the standards that govern that liability.40 In cases addressing the liability of
corporate individuals, courts have filled a similar void by disregarding tradi-
tional common law notions of corporate liability. Where the liability of suc-
cessor corporations is at issue, the courts reach the opposite result. In these
cases, the courts almost uniformly look to traditional notions of successor
liability in attempting to determine CERCLA's reach.
The leading case in this area is Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celo-
tex Corp.41 In Smith Land, a land purchaser performed an EPA-mandated
clean up of asbestos waste and sought contribution from the corporate suc-
cessors to the entity responsible for the disposal of that waste. Although the
Smith Land court recognized that CERCLA did not address successor lia-
bility, the court concluded that the concerns that led to the common law
principles of successor liability equally applied to CERCLA liability.4 2 The
court concluded that requiring the application of traditional successor liabil-
36. Thomas Solvent Co., 727 F. Supp. at 1544, 1562; Arco Indus. Corp., 723 F. Supp. at
1220.
37. Id.
38. At least one additional court has adopted the prevention test and applied it to the
liability of a shareholder of a liable corporation. Quadion Corp. v. Mache, 738 F. Supp. 270
(N.D. Ill. 1990).
39. In announcing the prevention test, the court in these cases expressly denied that
"mere status as a corporate officer or director" would be enough to support liability. Thomas
Solvent Co., 727 F. Supp. at 1544, 1562; Arco Indus. Corp., 723 F. Supp. at 1220. It is difficult
to see how this could be true in practice.
40. Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86, 91 (3d Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1029 (1989).
41. Id. It is important to note, however, that Smith Land did not address the extent to
which corporate CERCLA liability survives when a liable corporation sells its assets to an-
other. Instead, the court limited itself to mergers and consolidations, through which predeces-
sor liabilities traditionally survive. Id. at 91.
42. Id. at 91.
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ity concepts appropriately followed the legislation's intent.43 The court went
on to express its desire for a uniform federal common law of successor liabil-
ity while noting that, with few exceptions, the issue remained academic be-
cause of the general agreement among states concerning the principles of
successor liability.44
Most other courts addressing corporate successor liability under CER-
CLA have adopted the analysis of Smith Land. These courts generally de-
termine the identity of the person liable pursuant to the language of the
statute and proceed to analyze whether to impose liability on any corporate
successors to that person by applying traditional common law principles. 45
In the process, the courts also address the one question left open by Smith
Land: the liability of a corporate successor that purchases assets from a
liable entity.46 Courts, almost uniformly, use the common law test applica-
ble to asset purchasers to determine the existence of CERCLA liability.
Under this test, a corporation acquiring the assets of another does not ac-
quire the corresponding liabilities unless one of the following four exceptions
applies:
(1) the successor expressly or impliedly assumes the liabilities,
(2) the transaction is a de facto merger or consolidation,
(3) the successor is a mere continuation of the predecessor, or
(4) the transaction is a fraudulent effort to avoid the predecessor's
liabilities. 47
The Delaware district court in United States v. Chrysler Corporation4 8 re-
cently applied the foregoing test in an unreported decision. The Chrysler
court found that the defendant assumed responsibility for its predecessor's
CERCLA liability under the first exception.49 The result itself is not partic-
ularly noteworthy; however, the court rejected the United States' argument
43. Id. at 92.
44. Id.
45. See, e.g., In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor Proceeding, 712 F. Supp.
1010, 1013-14 (D. Mass. 1989) (holding that the common law doctrine of successor liability
applies in a CERCLA case analysis); Ametek, Inc. v. Pioneer Salt and Chem. Co., 709 F.
Supp. 556, 559 (E.D. Penn. 1988) (in suits brought under CERCLA where statute remains
silent on successor-in-interest issue, courts apply common law test for successor liability);
United States v. Vertac Chem. Corp., 671 F. Supp. 595, 614-16 (E.D. Ark. 1987), vacated, 855
F.2d 856 (8th Cir. 1988) (analyzing the existence of successor liability under the common law
doctrine of mere continuance). See generally Frost, Ingram & Squire, Corporate Successor
Liability Under CERCLA: Who's Next?, 43 S.w. L.J. 887, 888-908 (1990) (describing the
common law doctrine of successor liability and successor liability under CERCLA) [hereinaf-
ter Frost].
46. See supra note 34.
47. See, e.g., In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor Proceedings, 712 F. Supp. at
1014 (D. Mass., 1989) (citing four exceptions and imposing successor liability after finding a de
facto merger); Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Asarco, Inc., 909 F.2d 1260 (5th Cir. 1990) (succes-
sor liable if de facto merger occurred); Kelley v. Thomas Solvent Co., 29 Env't Rep. Cas.
(BNA) 1119, 1128-30 (W.D. Mich. 1988) (using mere continuation exception and imposing
successor liability); United States v. Vertac Chem. Corp., 671 F. Supp. 595, 614 (E.D. Ark.
1987), vacated, 855 F.2d 856 (8th Cir. 1988) (applying the mere continuation exception and
imposing successor liability).
48. United States v. Chrysler Corp., 59 U.S.L.W. 2228 (D. Del. Aug. 28, 1990) (court




that the defendant was liable under an expanded view of the continuation
theory, which was apparently the primary argument made by the
government.50
As one would expect, not all courts confronting the issue of successor
liability have reached the conclusions articulated in Smith Land. At least
one court, for example, rejected Smith Land and refused to find that corpo-
rate successors could be held responsible, even derivatively, for a predeces-
sor's CERCLA liability.51 Another court purported to follow Smith Land
while, in the manner of the courts addressing corporate individual liability,
proceeding to rewrite traditional successor liability principles in light of its
view of CERCLA's remedial purpose. 52 Specifically, this court concluded
that a relaxed version of the "mere continuation" exception should apply in
CERCLA cases.53 Under this test, dubbed "substantial continuity," the
court considered a number of factually-intensive factors to conclude that the
defendant was liable for the CERCLA problems of its predecessors.
Despite the exceptions discussed above, the courts generally have applied
common law successor liability principles in defining CERCLA's reach. As
a result, these courts have adopted an approach to this issue that is radically
different from that used by courts addressing individual liability. As CER-
CLA and its legislative history are silent as to both forms of liability, these
disparate approaches are difficult to reconcile or justify.
C. Parent Corporation Liability
CERCLA once again is silent concerning the liability, if any, Congress
intended parent corporations to bear for the hazardous waste indiscretions
of their present and former subsidiaries. Unlike the courts addressing indi-
vidual liability or successor liability, courts considering this issue have not
even approached a consensus. 54 To the contrary, the results cover the spec-
50. This result is particularly significant since the court rebuffed the government's conten-
tion that, in light of the purposes of the statute, the common law "continuation" exception
should be broadened in favor of finding liability. Id.; see infra notes 52-53 and accompanying
text (discussing Distler decision in which common law test is relaxed in this manner); see also
Frost, supra note 45 at 905-08 (discussing government efforts to expand CERCLA liability for
successors).
51. Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 734 F. Supp. 793 (E.D. Mich. 1989). The
Anspec Court found no ambiguity in the description of the parties that were liable under CER-
CLA; accordingly, while the court agreed that successor liability was desirable, it concluded
that it was not entitled to develop a federal common law interpreting these unambiguous pro-
visions. Id. The Sixth Circuit recently reversed the district court's ruling, finding that under
traditional rules of statutory construction successors could be liable under CERCLA. Anspec
Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., - F.2d - (6th Cir. 1990) (available on Westlaw at 1991 WL
291).
52. United States v. Distler, 741 F. Supp. 637, 640 (W.D. Ky. 1990). The court in Distler
said initially that it agreed with Smith Land that common law rules for successor liability
would control. Id. It then agreed with the government that a broader test was appropriate.
Id. at 643.
53. Id. This test is similar to the position urged by the United States and rejected by the
court in Chrysler. See supra note 48. A similarly relaxed version of the "mere continuation"
exception recently was rejected in Sylvester Bros. Dev. Co. v. Burlington N. R.R., 1990 U.S.
Dist. Lexis 15115 (D. Minn. Sept. 11, 1990) (granting summary judgment to successor).
54. As discussed above, courts addressing individual liability generally have ignored com-
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trum, with some courts rejecting common law corporate separateness while
others embrace it.
On one hand, a number of courts have adopted an analysis akin to that
employed in the corporate individuals cases. These cases typically pay little
attention to traditional tests used to pierce the corporate veil and reach the
parent, opting instead for the conclusion that the parent can be, and typi-
cally is, directly liable as an owner or operator, despite the existence of an
intervening subsidiary.55 Other courts, including the Fifth Circuit, have re-
fused to reject traditional corporate separateness and have held that a parent
can be liable for a subsidiary's CERCLA problems only if the corporate veil
is pierced.5 6 In doing so, these courts have taken an approach akin to that
found in corporate successor cases.
Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co. 57 is one of the leading cases in the former group.
Bunker Hill concerned whether a non-resident parent corporation was sub-
ject to jurisdiction as a result of, and could be liable under CERCLA for, the
activities of its resident subsidiary. The court first addressed the jurisdiction
issue, concluding that the parent's involvement with its subsidiary estab-
lished sufficient contacts to exercise jurisdiction. 8 Turning to the liability
issue, the court concluded, without further analysis, that the parent was
either an owner or an operator based upon the same facts used to establish
jurisdiction.59 Relying upon NEPACCO, 60 the court proceeded to find,
without mentioning the corporate veil standard, that the parent company
was an owner or operator, and therefore directly liable under CERCLA,
because it was intimately familiar with its subsidiary's hazardous waste prac-
tices and "could control" those practices.61
The Bunker Hill court thus adopted an approach to parent company lia-
mon law principles, while courts in successor liability cases have opted to apply traditional
principles. See supra notes 40-53 and accompanying text.
55. E.g., United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 910 F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1990) (parent corpora-
tion held liable as an operator); Mobay Corp. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., - F. Supp. - (D.N.J.
1991) (parent can be liable as "operator" without piercing veil) (available on Westlaw at 1991
WL 389). Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. IU Int'l Corp., 702 F. Supp. 1384 (N.D. Il1. 1988) (parent
corporation found liable without the need to pierce the corporate veil); Idaho v. Bunker Hill
Co., 635 F. Supp. 665 (D. Idaho 1986) (parent found to be intimately familiar with waste
disposal and releases of subsidiary).
56. E.g., Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. T.L. James & Co., Inc., 893 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1990) (court
found no legislative intent to change traditional corporate law); In re Acushnet River & New
Bedford Harbor Proceedings, 675 F. Supp. 22 (D. Mass. 1987) (decision to pierce the corpo-
rate veil cannot be based solely on the importance of the underlying statute).
57. 635 F. Supp. 665 (D. Idaho 1986).
58. Id. at 670-71. In many respects, this jurisdictional analysis was superfluous because
the court also found, as an alternative basis for jurisdiction, that the parent was collaterally
estopped to deny the existence of jurisdiction based upon the outcome of a prior action involv-
ing personal injuries allegedly caused by pollution. Id.
59. Id. at 671.
60. United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987) (imposing liability directly upon both a corporation
and its officers).
61. 635 F. Supp. at 673. Although not characterized as such, the court's discussion of
NEPA CCO appears to be an alternative basis for the conclusion reached through the jurisdic-
tional analysis.
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bility similar to the approach used in NEPACCO and the prevention test
cases. First, the court wholly ignored the traditionally applied tests-here,
piercing the corporate veil-for determining if the parent should be account-
able for the subsidiary's liability. Indeed, as in NEPACCO, the subsidiary's
liability seems irrelevant to the Bunker Hill court because it found the parent
directly liable under the statute. Second, the focus of the court's inquiry in
Bunker Hill was the parent's capacity to control and not its actual involve-
ment in the liability-causing activities. Like the prevention test, it is difficult
to conceive of a parent corporation that could escape liability if the inquiry
centers upon its capacity to control its subsidiary. 62
Rockwell International Corp. v. IU International Corp.63 also falls within
the former group; however, the Rockwell court approached the issue with a
slightly different analysis. Rockwell rejected the notion that a parent corpo-
ration should be liable simply because it had the ability to control its subsidi-
ary;64 instead, the court required that the parent "actually exercise
control."'65 Having announced what appeared to be a test recognizing tradi-
tional notions of corporate separateness, the Rockwell court indicated that a
routine level of involvement in its subsidiary's activity was enough to show
that a parent in fact "actually exercised control." 66 Thus, the Rockwell deci-
sion stands for the proposition that a parent may be liable under CERCLA
based upon far less involvement with its subsidiary than traditional princi-
ples would require.67
United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp. 68 took a third approach in reaching a
result that falls squarely within the Bunker Hill/Rockwell camp. In Kayser-
Roth, the First Circuit concluded that a parent company could be held liable
as an operator under a standard different than if the parent was alleged to be
62. Like the courts in the "prevention test" cases, the Bunker Hill court claims "that
'normal' activities of a parent with respect to its subsidiary do not automatically warrant find-
ing the parent an owner or operator." Id. at 672. It is likely, however, that practical applica-
tion of the court's "capacity to control" test will render this claim little more than wishful
thinking. Cf Quadion Corp. v. Mache, 738 F. Supp. 270 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (applying preven-
tion test to corporate shareholder).
63. 702 F. Supp. 1384 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
64. "Mere ability to exercise control as a result of the financial relationship of the parties
is insufficient for liability to attach." Id. at 1390.
65. Id. This test is noteworthy for the additional reason that it is strikingly similar to the
test recently announced by the EPA for defining when a secured creditor participates in the
management of a facility and thereby loses the benefit of the secured creditor exemption of
§ 9601(20)(A). See supra note 9. In this proposed rule, the EPA rejected the test announced
in United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550 (11 th Cir. 1990), which focused upon
the capacity of a lender to influence operations and not the lender's actual conduct.
66. The Rockwell court cited the following to support its conclusion that the parent con-
trolled its subsidiary: it hired or approved the hiring of certain subsidiary officers; it deter-
mined the duties of those officers; the officers operated the facility at issue; the parent
established procedures for the facility and monitored the subsidiary's compliance; parent com-
pany auditors and accountants reviewed the subsidiary and requests made by it; and, the par-
ent had publicly said it operated the facility. Rockwell, 702 F. Supp. at 1390-91.
67. See also Mobay Corp. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., - F. Supp. - (D.N.J. 1991) (available
on Westlaw at 1991 WL 389), in which the court announced a test for a parent's "operator"
liability under CERCLA that does not require the level of proof needed in a strict veil-piercing
test.
68. 910 F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1990).
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an owner.69 Thus, while the court conceded that corporate status was rele-
vant to determine owner liability, 70 it concluded that active involvement in
the affairs of a subsidiary was sufficient to impose operator liability upon a
parent. 7'
Among other things, 72 Kayser-Roth is noteworthy because its analysis of
the purported difference in owner and operator liability was wholly unneces-
sary. The district court opinion being reviewed in Kayser-Roth analyzed the
parent company's liability under a number of theories, including a tradi-
tional corporate veil approach.73 Under that analysis, the district court con-
cluded that the subsidiary's "veil should be pierced."' 74 Accordingly, the
First Circuit did not have to reach its conclusions regarding the purported
difference between owner and operator liability; it could have affirmed based
upon traditional corporate veil principles. 75
In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor Proceedings76 was one of the
earliest cases to reject the approach taken by the Bunker Hill line of cases,
opting instead to apply traditional corporate separateness principles to a par-
ent's alleged liability. In Acushnet River, the United States and the Com-
monwealth of Massachusetts urged the court to disregard a parent's separate
existence if it found that the parent's contact with its subsidiary went beyond
a "pure investment relationship. ' 77 The court's reasoning in rejecting that
position is instructive. It first noted that the rule proposed by the govern-
ment would discourage solvent parties from investing in the acquisition and
cleanup of contaminated properties or businesses.78 More importantly, the
69. Id. at 26-27.
70. Id. at 26. The Kayser-Roth court specifically declined to address the possible liability
of the parent as an owner. Id. at 28 n. 11. The Rockwell court also analyzed parent company
liability only as an operator; however, that court indicated that it would be necessary to pierce
the corporate veil to impose liability upon the parent as an "owner". Rockwell, 702 F. Supp. at
1390.
71. The court declined to address the exact standard necessary to find a parent liable as an
operator, based upon the district court's conclusion that the parent "exerted practical total
influence and control." Kaysher-Roth, 910 F.2d at 27.
72. Kayser-Roth appears to stand for the proposition that, while there can be only one
owner of a facility at any given time, there can be any number of operators. This view is
analogous to the NEPACCO view that an individual can operate a facility at the same time his
or her employer does. See United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 810
F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987).
73. United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 724 F. Supp. 15, 20-24 (D.R.I. 1989), aff'd, 910
F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1990).
74: 724 F. Supp. at 24.
75. The same could be said for the district court which indicated that a parent could be
held directly liable, as an operator, or indirectly liable under traditional corporate principles.
Id. at 22-24. When it attempted to apply this dual method of finding liability, the court ap-
plied essentially the same factors to both "types" of liability. Accordingly, its analysis of direct
liability was unnecessary.
76. 675 F. Supp. 22 (D.Mass. 1987).
77. Id. at 31-32.
78. Under traditional principles, a corporation which wants to put a waste site or
past generation site to productive use can do so by creating a well capitalized,
non-fraudulent, separate corporate subsidiary. The ability to work through the
subsidiary justifies the initial investment, which will delimit the extent of the
risk. Under the sovereigns' proposed rule, a corporation which wanted to 'e-
claim and make productive a waste site could not do so without risking all its
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court stressed that "[n]o matter how important the policies underlying CER-
CLA, it still remains true that 'limited liability is the rule, not the excep-
tion.' ",79 Because the court saw no evidence of a Congressional intent to
change this rule, it opted to follow the rule of limited liability. 80 The court
in Acushnet River proceeded to apply a traditional analysis 8' to the parent's
alleged CERCLA liability. Based upon that traditional analysis, the court
refused to disregard the parent's corporate separateness. 82
In Joslyn Manufacturing Co. v. T L. James & Co.,83 the Fifth Circuit
similarly refused to disregard a parent company's separate existence in order
to impose upon it a subsidiary's CERCLA liability. The court noted that
CERCLA does not include parent companies within its definition of owner
or operator and that nothing in the legislative history indicated an intent to
substantially alter a "basic tenet of corporation law."' 84 Like the Acushnet
River court, the Fifth Circuit in Joslyn stated that any "bold rewriting of
corporation law in this area is best left to Congress."'85 Having reached this
conclusion, Joslyn then affirmed the district court's decision86 that the par-
ent's corporate separateness should not be disregarded.8 7
corporate assets if it appeared to be more than passively interested in the per-
formance of its subsidiary.
79. Id. (citation omitted).
80. The court stated: "If a change so fundamental as to impose CERCLA liability on
parent corporations for no reason other than the fact that they did not ignore the performance
of their subsidiary is to come at all, it must come from the Congress, not the courts." Id.
81. In this analysis, the general inquiry is whether the corporate entity should be disre-
garded "in the interests of public convenience, fairness and equity." In re Acushnet River &
New Bedford Harbor Proceedings, 675 F. Supp. 22, 33 (D. Mass. 1987). Acushnet River iden-
tified the following factors as a part of that inquiry:
(1) inadequate capitalization
(2) extensive or pervasive control
(3) intermingling of properties or accounts
(4) failure to observe formalities and separateness
(5) siphoning of funds
(6) absence of corporate records
(7) nonfunctioning officers and directors.
Id.
82. Id. at 35.
83. 893 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1990).
84. Id. at 82. In this regard, the analysis in Joslyn is exactly the opposite of that used in
NEPACCO, where the court viewed the failure expressly to exclude corporate officers and
directors as an indication that they were to be included. United States v. Northeastern Phar-
maceutical & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987).
85. Joslyn, 893 F.2d at 83. The court also made two critical observations. First, it noted
that, in the absence of a Congressional directive to the contrary, it should abide by common
law principles. Id. Second, the court observed that Congress had in the past, when it so
desired, made shareholders, parents and the like liable for the activities of otherwise valid
corporations. Id. (citing the "control" test found in CERCLA at 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601 (20)(A)(iii)).
86. Joslyn Corp. v. T.L. James & Co., 696 F. Supp. 222 (W.D. La. 1988), affid, 893 F.2d
80 (5th Cir. 1990).
87. 893 F.2d at 83. It is worth noting that, in Joslyn, the United States had urged adop-
tion of a standard only slightly more deferential than the "pure investment" position urged in
Acushnet River. Before the 5th Circuit, the United States contended that under CERCLA the
corporate veil should be pierced where:
A. The financial resources of the subsidiary are not adequate to pay the CERCLA re-
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Bunker Hill, Rockwell and Kayser-Roth, while analytically different in
some respects, all stand for an analysis of CERCLA liability that parallels
the analysis used in the NEPACCO and Shore Realty line of cases. In these
cases, corporate separateness routinely is disregarded or ignored, and liabil-
ity is imposed directly upon entities or individuals that did not formally own
or operate a facility or transport or generate any waste. Acushnet River and
Joslyn, on the other hand, take the opposite approach and, like the successor
cases, refuse to impose CERCLA liability unless they find an entity liable
under the plain language of the statute88 and a traditional common law basis
for transferring that entity's liability to another.
IV. THE BETTER ALTERNATIVE: A SINGLE APPROACH
The disparate approaches taken by the courts in these various corporate
contexts might spark little more than academic interest were it not for the
uncertainty they create in the business community.89 Lawyers in a variety of
practice areas are asked routinely to give advice concerning the potential
CERCLA liability that clients may face as a result of engaging in what were
heretofore common business practices. Too often, the response must urge
excessive caution in the face of decisions imposing liability upon corporate
officers based upon their authority and upon parent corporations for doing
little more than reading the yearly reports of their subsidiaries. The uncer-
tainty caused by these disparate positions, in all likelihood, deters beneficial
economic activity.90 Adoption of a single approach to defining CERCLA
liability in the corporate context, even one that expands the -reach of that
liability, would likely be beneficial if it helped remove that uncertainty.
Of the two approaches developed by the courts, the analysis of the
NEPACCO, Shore Realty, Kayser-Roth group cannot withstand scrutiny and
sponse costs for which it is liable .... or [it] is otherwise not available to pay those
costs ... ; and
B. The subsidiary performs a function of economic importance to the enterprise of the
parent or the parent participates directly in the management of the subsidiary.
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 47 (emphasis in original), Joslyn Mfg. Co. v.
T.L. James & Co., Inc., 893 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1990). As a practical matter, it is unlikely that
any parent corporation could escape liability under this standard because the parent would not
be pursued if the subsidiary could pay; moreover, it is difficult to imagine a subsidiary that
would not "perform a function of economic importance" to the parent.
88. That is, a formal owner, operator, generator, or transporter.
89. Hordes of commentators have attempted to sort out CERCLA's implications in a
wide range of areas. See, e.g., Buchanan, Potential Liability of Fiduciaries for Environmental
Contamination: Is There Cause for Alarm?, 10 ENVTL. L. NEWSL. 1 (1990) (discussing risk of
CERCLA liability for fiduciaries); Ryan & Wright, Hazardous Waste Liability and the Surety,
25 TORT & INS. L.J. 663 (1990) (discussing risk of CERCLA liability of sureties); DeWitt and
Denton, Personal Liability Under CERCLA for Corporate Officers and Directors, 5 Toxics L.
Rep. (BNA) 375 (1990) (discusses developing case law on personal liability for officers and
directors).
90. In this regard, the speculation of the Acushnet River court is increasingly becoming a
fact. See supra note 77. For a discussion of the burdens created by CERCLA and the courts'
inability to articulate a unified role in a related context, see Comment, Insureds Versus Insur-
ers: Litigating Comprehensive General Liability Policy Coverage in the CERCLA Arena-A
Losing Battle for Both Sides, 43 Sw. L.J. 969, 992-95 (1990) (authored by Debi L. Davis).
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should be rejected by future courts. First, those cases routinely tout the un-
derlying purpose and policies of CERCLA as the basis for the expansive
views they adopt.91 While these purposes and policies may be laudable,
nothing in the statute or its legislative history suggests that Congress in-
tended to subvert or substantially alter well-settled common law principles
of corporation law to achieve them.92 Second, many of the cases blindly rely
upon the questionable statutory interpretations articulated in Shore Realty
and NEPACCO without analysis. As demonstrated above, those early inter-
pretations are flawed. Finally, the usually fact-intensive approach used in
these cases provides little guidance to the business community concerning
the type of conduct that will subject one to CERCLA liability; therefore, it
does little to enhance predictability and reduce uncertainty. Indeed, it is
only if these cases are extended further and liability is imposed upon all
corporate parents, successors, and individuals, merely because of their status
as such, that uncertainty can be eliminated. That Congress did not intend
such a wholesale abandonment of corporate principles is apparent.
The approach used in the successor cases, Acushnet River and Joslyn, on
the other hand, does withstand scrutiny, would serve to reduce uncertainty,
and should be adopted uniformly by the courts. This approach generally
requires proof, first, that a person is liable under CERCLA because it for-
mally owned or operated a facility or generated or transported waste.
Thereafter, the analysis shifts to the possible liability of other individuals or
entities related or associated in some way with the liable person - usually as
parents, successors, or officers and directors - using traditional corporate
liability principles. CERCLA liability of the original person is imposed
upon the associated party only when these traditional principles have been
satisfied.
This latter approach is superior for several reasons. First, it does not re-
quire a conclusion that Congress silently intended to rewrite corporate law
in the CERCLA area; to the contrary, it reinforces long held beliefs in the
importance of traditional corporate principles.93 This approach also com-
ports with the notion that the sweeping changes implied by NEPA CCO and
Kayser-Roth must be explicit. 94 Second, this approach does not rely upon
91. E.g., United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co., 810 F.2d 726,
743 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987) (claiming that failure to hold corporate
individuals liable would create "enormous, and clearly unintended loophole"); New York v.
Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1045 (2d Cir. 1985) (refusing to interpret CERCLA in a
way that "frustrates the statute's goals"); United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 910 F.2d 24, 26
(1st Cir. 1990) (adopting the approach taken in Shore Realty).
92. See Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. T.L. James & Co., Inc., 893 F.2d 80, 82 (5th Cir. 1990); In re
Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor Proceedings, 675 F. Supp. 22, 32 (D. Mass. 1987).
93. Traditional principles of corporate separateness have long been recognized and pro-
tected by the courts. See Baker v. Raymond Int'l, Inc., 656 F.2d 173, 179 (5th Cir. 1981)
("principal of limited liability remains a dominant characteristic of American corporation
law"), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 983 (1982); Krivo Indus. Supply Co. v. National Distillers and
Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d 1098, 1102 (5th Cir. 1973)("[t]he corporate form ... is not lightly
disregarded"), modified, 490 F.2d 916 (5th Cir. 1974).
94. Cf Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey, 474 U.S. 494, 501 (1986) ("The normal rule
of statutory construction is that if Congress intends for legislation to change the interpretation
of a judicially created concept, it makes that intent specific.").
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any strained or erroneous readings of CERCLA's language. To the con-
trary, it adopts relatively straightforward readings of such vital terms as
owner, operator, and person by reading them against a traditional corporate
backdrop.
This approach is also preferable because it will decrease the uncertainty
generated by the disparate approaches presently in use. Businesses and their
lawyers generally are familiar with and able to predict, with relative confi-
dence, the type of conduct that will cause a corporate individual to become
liable for actions taken on behalf of the corporation or that will cause a court
to disregard a subsidiary's separate existence to reach the parent. By trans-
ferring these same corporate liability principles, without expansion, into the
analysis of CERCLA liability, the courts can tap this existing familiarity and
enable businessmen and counsel to better appreciate and predict the likely
consequences of their corporate conduct.
Finally, uniform adoption of this approach will not hinder efforts to pro-
mote CERCLA's remedial purpose; indeed, it may well promote Congres-
sional goals. A review of the cases that adopt the expansive view of
CERCLA liability in the name of CERCLA's purpose confirms this view.
In NEPACCO for example, at least one of the corporate officers was found
liable under a traditional corporate analysis. 95 The Shore Realty court also
found that the individual allegedly liable in that case specifically directed,
sanctioned, and actively participated in the corporation's activities creating
CERCLA liability.96 Based upon this finding, it is probable that the court
would have imposed liability under traditional principles governing corpo-
rate officers despite its refusal to pierce the veil. Similarly, the Kayser-Roth
court imposed liability upon the corporate parent based upon common law
principles.9 7 Most other courts using an expansive approach to liability
would arrive at the same conclusions by employing a traditional analysis. 98
Adopting a traditional approach to extending CERCLA's liability may
further promote the goals of the act by enabling businesses to invest in con-
taminated properties or activities using hazardous substances without risk-
ing corporate suicide.99 Presently, any corporation attempting to clean and
make use of a site contaminated by hazardous substances, even through a
legitimate subsidiary, risks financial collapse, as does the attorney advising
such corporation. Adopting an approach that encourages private entities to
undertake cleanups by allowing them legitimately to limit the risk involved
in the enterprise could well promote CERCLA's aim to fund cleanups,
95. NEPACCO, 810 F.2d at 744.
96. New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1052 (2d Cir. 1985).
97. United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 724 F. Supp. 15, 23 (D.R.I. 1989), afid, 910
F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1990).
98. See Joslyn Corp. v. T.L. James & Co., 696 F. Supp. 222, 232 (W.D. La. 1988), afid,
893 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1990) (noting that, while it rejected the analysis of Shore Realty,
NEPACCO, and other cases, the court would have reached the same result in at least some
cases by applying the common law rule holding corporate officers liable for conduct in which
they personally participate).
99. See supra notes 77, 86.
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wherever possible, through private funds, leaving federal funds for those in-
stances where little or no private funding can be found.
V. CONCLUSION
Since the enactment of CERCLA, courts have struggled to reconcile the
Act and its goals with the long-standing body of corporate law that recog-
nizes corporate separateness and, in most cases, limits liability. The result of
this struggle has been uncertainty regarding the types of corporate conduct
that will cause CERCLA liability to arise. That uncertainty can be allevi-
ated only by the adoption of a single approach to the clash of CERCLA and
corporate principles.
One option available to the courts is the expansive view of CERCLA lia-
bility articulated by the courts in NEPACCO, Shore Realty, and Kayser-
Roth. Under the analysis used in these decisions, uncertainty could be elimi-
nated by expanding CERCLA liability until it reaches corporate individuals,
parents, and successors, merely because of their status. Such an expansion is
unsupported by the language of CERCLA, its scant legislative history, and
traditional notions of statutory interpretation.
A better option is the uniform adoption of the analysis of the successor
cases, Acushnet River and Joslyn. A court proceeding under these standards
first must determine whether any persons expressly liable under the terms of
the statute exist - an easily accomplished task in most cases. Thereafter,
the court can examine whether that person's statutory liability can be im-
posed, under traditional corporate law principles, upon any individuals or
entities associated with the liable person. Because this approach employs
traditional, familiar legal concepts, it would reduce the uncertainty currently
surrounding this area and allow business to predict better the CERCLA con-
sequences of their conduct.
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